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In the Supretne Court of the
State of Utah
THOMAS P. SPRlJNT,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

The DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,

Case No.
8957

a corporation,

Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
During the daylight hours of January 4, 1957, the
plaintiff, a 58 year old switchman, employed by the defendant company, was injured when he attempted to board
an ore car of the defendant company which had just
started to move and which was travelling two or three
miles per hour. (R. 41). The accident occurred on the
switch tracks located on the property of the Vitro Chern-
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ical Company. The plaintiff was part of a switch crew
which was moving cars loaded with Uranium ore into the
private ·yards of Vitro Chemical Company and moving
the empties out (R. 13, R. 24). The process involved
bringing in a string of loaded cars, which were unloaded
by means of opening dump doors on the sides of the cars,
allowing the ore to fall out beside the track (R. 17). The
ore was then picked up by a clam shell machine (a diesel
machine with a two yard bucket) (R. 18), and deposited
in stock piles farther away from the track. Then a bulldozer would proceed along the area to attempt to remove
ore that had fallen between the rails and to clean and
smooth up the area adjacent to the tracks (R. 28).
Two or three cuts or groups of cars were delivered
each day (R. 26) so that 12 to 18 cars a day were unloaded (R. 25, 56). The switching and unloading was a
continuous process throughout the day (R. 137). According to the plaintiff the operation of the clam-shell in
picking up the ore took bites out of the ground in the
area adjacent to the track, which created the existence of
numerous holes 8 to 12 inches deep (R. 43). The witness
Patterson, another member of the crew, claimed that the
bulldozer did not necessarily remove all the holes in the
process of its smoothing operation (R. 19). This operation,
according to plaintiff and his witness, created a rough
area over which the plaintiff and other switchmen had to
walk. Patterson testified that the holes were uMaybe three
feet, maybe five feet" apart (R. 23).
Plaintiff testified as follows on page 53:

uQ. Even though the track was cleaned up and it
was cleaned up as slick as a bowling alley, when
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another string of cars would come it would clutter
up the situation?
ttA. Yes.

uQ. In other words, if you clean up as I say, clean
as a bowling alley, you would have to do it two or
three times a day?
ttA. Yes.

uQ. · You would have to interrupt unloading
operations?
ccA. Not necessarily.
ceQ. The work was done 1n that area by Vitro
people?
ttA. Yes.

uQ. With their clam shell?
ttA. Yes.

uQ. With their bulldozer?
ttA. Yes.

uQ. On their track?
ttA. Yes.

ceQ. On their property?
ttA. Well, as far as I know, it is."

Mr. John A. Rask, a retired D & RGW section
foreman, well acquainted with the condition of this yard
and with the nature of the switching and unloading
operation at the time of the accident, was called as a
witness by the plaintiff and on examination by plaintiff's
counsel, he stated the following:

uQ. At any time you were on these premises, did
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you find any smooth path for the switchmen to
walk on?
etA. Well, I don't know I have, it has been uneven,
it hasn't been too bad; where they unload cars and
dump them it is always rough.

((Q. Is it necessary to keep it rough?
((A. It is impossible to keep it otherwise with a
continuous operation of those cars.

uQ. You couldn't keep it up with a shovel as you
do with the men in your area?
uA. If they had an army of men, but not for each
continuous operation.

((Q. What do you mean by continuous operation?
((A. Dumping one car and another one on top, that
is a continuous operation all day long." (R. 137)
At the time of the accident there was a cclight skiff
of snow" on the ground (R. 31) . The plaintiff attempted
to board one of the moving cars by taking hold of a grab
iron on the side of the car with his left hand, putting his
foot in a stirrup and swinging himself up onto the car. He
claimed his foot slipped or he stepped into a hole, fell and
injured his left shoulder (R. 41-42).
Exactly what happened or what he did at the time of
the accident is not clear in the plaintiff's mind for he
describes it differently in different places in the record.

uQ. (By Mr. Patterson) Now, what happened when
you-describe how you started to mount the car,
what you did?
etA. Well, as a general rule when you are switching
on a lead, or anything, we most generally hit the
stirrup with our right foot and most generally
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reach up with the one hand, get hold of the grab
iron and follow up with the other, when I went to
follow up I slipped in the meantime, and I couldn't
get the grab iron.

(tQ. Why did you slip?
uA. I stepped in a hole.

ceQ. Will you describe that hole to the jury, please?
((A. Well, as far as I remember, it was a hole along
side the cars where we walked, made by the clam
shovel cleaning up the ore.

ceQ. Describe the hole itself as much as you can?
uA. I would say the hole was around between eight
and twelve inches deep." (R. 42-43)

Later, on cross examination, the plaintiff said:

(tQ. Mr. Sprunt, as I understand you reached up
with your left hand to board the car going about
two or three miles an hour, is that right?

HA. Yes sir.

uQ. When you got your hand on that particular
bar, how high would that be?

ccA. I would say about even with my face.

uQ. On these dump cars they are kind of low?
ccA. Well, yes, your ladder on cars is a standard
gauge.

(tQ. The grab iron you were going to reach from
the ground would be about that high?

teA. Yes.

uQ. You reached with your left hand?
ccA. Yes sir.
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"Q. When you reached with your left hand, did
you put any weight on there for the purpose of
boarding the car?
uA. Well, no, not exactly.

"Q. Mr. Sprunt, I am not trying to get you, in
detailing the matter to relate what each muscle did
in this particular time. When you reached up, what
was the usual way to do it, put the weight on one
hand?
uA. Most generally put the weight on both hands.

uQ. You reached with the left hand, and hadn't
got your weight up?
uA. No sir.

uQ. You were walking when this occurred?
uA. No.

uQ. You were standing still?
uA. Yes.

uQ. So you were standing still when the car came
past going about two or three miles an hour and you
reached up with your left hand?
uA. Yes sir, that is right.

uQ. Were you standing in a hole?
uA. No I wasn't.

HQ. Did you move your feet before you got aboard?
HA. That is something I can't say.

HQ. As you reached with your left hand, as you
started to board, your foot went in a hole?
"A. No, generally when you are boarding a car you
swing yourself on, when I went to swing on I
slipped." (R. 58-59)
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The plaintiff's left hand lost its grip on the grab iron
and he fell to the ground (R. 60).
On page 43 of the record, the plaintiff says:
it was done so quick I don't know how I fell."
H •••

Plaintiff's injuries consisted of a tear of the cuff of
the shoulder, the tendons that go around the head bone of
the shoulder (R. 69) . The plaintiff had suffered two dislocations of the same shoulder, once in 1941 and again
from an automobile accident in 1954 (R. 60). Plaintiff's
doctor, Charles Hall, acknowledged that the dislocation of
the shoulder in 1954 could have caused a tear in the tendons of the plaintiff's shoulder; that it may not have
healed; that it could have caused a weakness to exist in
the shoulder which would cause it to ugive away easily"
upon a subsequent occasion (R. 75) . The doctor said it
would be impossible for him to date the tear which he
observed some time after the January 4, 1957 accident and
would not be able to say with certainty whether or not
the tear, or part of it, had existed prior to the January 4
accident, but that in any event a previous tear would have
made the area of the shoulder involved more prone to
injury (R. 77) .
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING
THE QUESTION OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO THE JURY.
POINT II
THE JURY WAS JUSTIFIED IN ALLOTING
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THE NEGLIGENCE BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF
AND DEFENDANT AS IT DID.
POINT III
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED WAS
NOT INADEQUATE.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING
THE QUESTION OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO THE JURY.
The plaintiff bases his argument that the court erred
in submitting the issue of contributory negligence to the
jury on two points:
( 1) That defendant relied on the principle of assumption of risk rather than contributory negligence; and

(2) That the only contributory negligence claimed by
the defendant is that plaintiff elected to board the car in a
dangerous place when he could have boarded in a safe place.

With regard to plaintiff's first point defendant denies
that its case is in any way founded or dependent upon
the doctrine of assumption of risk. Defendant agrees with
plaintiff that uEvery vestige of the doctrine of assumption
of risk was obliterated from the law by the 1939 amendment" to the Federal Employers Liability Act, (Tiller vs.
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, 318 U.S. 54, 87
Lawyers Ed. 610). As admitted by plaintiff in his brief
(P. 23) the court ((Instructed the jury that assumption of
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risk was not a defense and that the burden of proving contributory negligence was on the defendant."
Consequently, defendant submits that none of plaintiff's cases with regard to assumption of risk are in point.
Defendant relies, as will be demonstrated hereafter, on
specific acts of negligence on the part of plaintiff to sustain its position that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent and that the court was bound to submit the issue of
contributory negligence to the jury.
With regard to plaintiff's second claim, the defendant
does not rely alone on plaintiff's selection of a place to
board the car as his only act of contributory negligence.
That was only one of several acts on his part which could
be construed by reasonable men acting on a jury as constituting negligence. Following are the acts appearing in
the record which reasonable jurors could conclude to be
negligent:
1. Jurors might reasonably have believed that the
plaintiff could and in the exercise of reasonable care should
have selected a s:;tfer place to board the car because:

(a) Plaintiff knew there were gouge marks left by
the clam shell which could constitute a hazard unless he
watched his footing carefully;
(b) There is evidence there was only a ulight skiff of
snow" on the ground (R. 31) ;
(c) Plaintiff claimed the gouge mark involved was
eight to twelve inches deep (R. 43);
(d) The gouge marks were three to five feet apart
(R. 23).
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Members of the jury could reasonably have concluded
that a hole eight to twelve inches deep could and should
have been seen by the plaintiff if there was only a light
skiff of snow on it; indeed, they could ask, how did the
plaintiff know it was eight to twelve inches deep if it was
not ·Capable of being observed; and inasmuch as there were
areas three to five feet wide without holes or gouge marks,
he had plenty of opportunity to stand in areas of safety to
board the car and did not have to stand on the edge of a
hole.
2. The plaintiff admitted in his testimony that it was
customary to take hold of a grab iron with both hands and
distribute the task of pulling oneself up onto the car
between both hands. On page 58 of the Record, plaintiff
was asked by counsel uwhen you reached up, what was the
usual way to do it, put the weight on one hand?" and the
plaintiff answered nMost generally put the weight on
both hands." Members of the jury may reasonably have
concluded that the plaintiff was negligent in this instance
in grabbing with one hand and imposing all of the initial
strain on that one arm, his left, rather than using both
arms, especially when the plaintiff was conscious of the
fact that his left shoulder was weak from previous dislocations.
3. The jury may have disbelieved the plaintiff when
he stated that ttl stepped into a hole" because they may
have realized the obvious fact that with one foot elevated
in the stirrup of the car, it would be impossible for plaintiff to take a step with the other foot and therefore he
must either have (a) missed his hand hold; or (b) slipped
on the skiff of snow and fell because he negligently failed
to acquire a firm grip on the grab iron-a grip sufficient
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to stand the strain of pulling him up off the ground and
onto the car.
4. The members of the jury may reasonably have believed that the plaintiff carelessly got a foot in the stirrup
before he took a firm grip-or any grip at all with his
hand-and as a result lost his balance and slipped and fell.
5. The jury may reasonably have concluded it was
negligent for plaintiff to attempt to board the car from
an area of rough footing when he could have walked alongside the car and performed his duties. Mr. Sprunt claimed
that he had to board the car so that he could give signals
to the engineer. However, the jury may not have believed
that in light of the fact that Mr. Patterson, the other
switchman, testified that he, Patterson, was riding the head
end car of the seven or eight car cut (R. 20), that is, the
car farthest from the engine (the cars were being backed
toward the hopper) and he, Patterson, gave the signal to
the engineer to make the backward movement and to stop
the movement when he saw the plaintiff lying on the
ground. Therefore, according to Patterson's testimony he,
Patterson, was where the engineer could see him and he
being on the lead car would be the man to give the signal
when to stop the cut in the vicinity of the hopper. In other
words, in spite of the plaintiff's statement, it does not
appear from the Record that the plaintiff would have been
the man to give the signal, for he would have been riding
on the east side of a car about halfway between the end
of the cut and the engine. He would have been in no position to know when the stop signal should be given to the
engineer to stop the cut when the cars were properly lined
up for the hopper (R. 20) .
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6. The plaintiff states in-ane place in the record that

he was standing still when he attempted to board the car.
In another place he says he stepped in a hole. With this conflict in his account of the incident, members of the jury
could reasonably have concluded that he was walking immediately before he attempted to board or that at least he
took one step before or as he. attempted to board and that
he simply didn't observe with due care where he was
stepping and that the careless step resulted in the slip and
the fall.
7. Members of the jury might have reasonably concluded that the alleged hole had nothing to do with the
fall; that the plaintiff didn't slip or step into a hole, because on page 59 of the record, plaintiff testified as
follows:
HQ. As you reached with your left hand, as you
started to board, your foot went in a hole?
HA. No, generally when you are boarding a car you
swing yourself on, when I went to swing on I
slipped."

Earlier on page 43 of the record, the plaintiff said:
it was done so quick I don't know how I fell."
H •••

Consequently members of the jury could reasonably
have concluded that the cause of this accident was that the
plaintiff did not step with due care on the slippery snow
on the ground and because of his lack of care simply
slipped on the snow and the hole had nothing to do with it.
The seven items above are all examples of conduct on
the part of the plaintiff documented in the record which
the Jury could reasonably consider negligence. None of
them have anything to do with assumption of risk. None
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of them are dependent on or related to the assumption of
risk doctrine.
In light of the above decisions that might have been
made by reasonable men acting on a jury, let us take a
look at the law applicable.
Defendant will borrow from one of the cases cited by
the plaintiff in his brief to restate a well established principle of law. The case is Anderson vs. Nixon, 139 P.2 216,
a Utah case decided in 1943.
((For the purpose of determining whether the
evidence was sufficient to sustain plaintiff's contentions, the jury having found in his favor, this
court will consider as true where there is any conflict in the evidence that which is most favorable
to plaintiff's position."
What is good for the goose is good for the gander in
determining whether or not an issue of negligence or contributory negligence should be submitted to the jury. The
above language from the Anderson case can be accurately
paraphrased to apply in this case where the defendant is
contending that the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence was properly submitted to the jury.
((For the purpose of determining whether the
evidence is sufficient to sustain defendant's contention that plaintiff was contributorily negligent,
the jury having found in defendant's favor, this
court should consider as true, where there is any
conflict in the evidence, that which is most favorable to the defendant's position."
In the case of Stickle vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company 251 P. 2 867 ( 1952 Utah), Justice Crockett sue-
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cinctly stated the position which the defendant takes in
the case at bar.

((It should be kept in mind that so far as the
quantum of proof necessary to take the question of
contributory negligence from the jury is concerned,
the tests are the same as with respect to primary
negligence."
Later the court said:
((In our democratic system, the people are the
repository of power whence the law is derived;
from its initiation and creation to its final application and enforcement, the law is the expression of
their will. The functioning of a cross-section of the
citizenry as a jury is the method by which the
people express this will in the application of law to
controversies which arise under it. Both our constitutional and statutory provisions assure trial by
jury to citizens of this state.
((Courts, as final arbiters of law, could arrogate
to themselves arbitrary and dangerous powers by
presuming to determine questions of fact which
litigants have a right to have passed upon by juries.
Part of the merit of the jury system is its safeguarding against such arbitrary power in the courts.
To the great credit of the courts of this country,
they have been extremely reluctant to infringe
upon this right, and by leaving it unimpaired have
kept the administration of justice close to the
people."
Justice Crockett went on later to say in the same
optruon:

HA very fine statement of the proper attitude
toward this right was expressed for this court by
the late Mr. Justice Frick in Newton vs. Oregon
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Short Line R. Co. where, in referring to the question of submitting plaintiff's contributory negligence to a jury, he made these statements:
(The court can pass upon the question of
negligence only in clear cases.
unless the question of negligence is
free from doubt, the court cannot pass upon
it as a question of law; ... if ... the .court is
in doubt whether reasonable men, . . . might
arrive at different conclusions, then this very
doubt determines the question to be one of
fact for the jury and not one of law for the
court.'"
t

•••

In the case of Rogalski vs. Phillips Petroleum Company, 282 P. 2 304 (1955 Utah) which was a master and
servant case, Justice McDonough speaking for the court
said in the opinion:

\

((It has been frequently announced by this
court that contributory negligence is a question
for the jury unless all reasonable men must draw
the same conclusion from the facts as they are
shown. Shafer v. Keeley Ice Cream Co., 65 Utah
46, 234 P. 300, 3 8 A.L.R. 1523; Lowe v. Salt Lake
City, 13 Utah 91,44 P. 1050, 57 Am. St. Rep. 708;
Baker v. Decker, 117 Utah 15, 212 P. 2d 679.
As was said in Linden v. Anchor Min. Co., 20 Utah
134, 58 P. 355, 358:
(Where there is uncertainty as to the existence
of either negligence or contributory negligence, the
question is not one of law, but of fact, and to
be settled by a jury; and this, whether the uncertainty arises from a conflict in the testimony, or
because, the facts being undisputed, fair-minded
men will honestly draw different conclusions from
them.'"
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In the case which plaintiff relies on most in his brief,
that of Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company,
318 U.S. 54 (1943) the court clearly supports defendant's
contention in this case 'that the issue of contributory negligence should be submitted to the jury whenever there
are any disputed questions of fact. Inasmuch as this is
admittedly such an important case, a statement of the
facts would not be inappropriate. In the court's words,
the facts were as follows:
(( . . . Tiller (the plaintiff) was standing between two tracks in the respondent's switch yards,
tracks which allowed him three feet, seven and
one-half inches of standing space when trains were
moving on both sides. The night was dark and the
yard was unlighted. Tiller, using a flashlight for
the purpose, was inspecting the seals of the train
moving slowly on one track when suddenly he was
hit and killed by the rear car of a train backing in
the opposite direction on the other track. The rear
of the train which killed Tiller was unlighted although a brakeman with a lantern was riding the
back step on the side away from Tiller. The bell
was ringing on the engine but both trains were
moving. The Circuit Court found that it was
(probable that Tiller did not hear cars approaching'
from behind him. No special signal of warning
was given."
After eloquently disposing of the defense of assumption of risk, the court (Justice Black) said:
uNo case is to be withheld from a jury on any
theory of assumption of risk and questions of negligence should under proper charge from the court
be submitted to the jury for their determination.
Many years ago this court said of the problems of
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negligence, (we see no reason, so long as the jury
system is the law of the land, and the jury is made
· the tribunal to decide disputed questions of fact,
why it shouldn't decide such questions as these as
well as others.' Jones v. Tennessee, V & GR Company, 128 U.S. 443, 445, 32 Lawyers Edition 478,
479. Or as we have put it on another occasion,
(where the facts are in dispute, and the evidence in
relation to them is that from which fair-minded
men may draw different inferences,' the case should
go to the jury.
((We think that the question of negligence on
the part of the railroad and on the part of the employee should have been submitted to the jury."
In the Utah case of Cooper v. Evans, 262 P. 2d 278
(Utah 1953), the principle of law is put in sharp focus
by the fact that in that case the plaintiff claimed, as in
this one, that she should have been determined by the
court to be free of contributory negligence as a matter of
law. This case is particularly helpful because some of the
facts of it are strikingly analagous to some of the facts
involved in the case at bar.
In the Cooper case the plaintiff received injuries in a
fall over a portion of a merchandise platform owned by
the defendants which jutted out into a walk-way in the
defendants' store. The Trial court entered judgment for
the defendants and the plaintiff appealed. In the trial
court the judge had submitted an interrogatory for the
jury to answer, asking whether plaintiff's failure to observe and see the platform amounted to contributory negligence. The jury answered the question in the affirmative
and based on the jury's finding of contributory negligence,
the court entered judgment for the defendants.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
The court, in the case at bar, might very well have
submitted a similar interrogatory to the jury, asking
whether or not they believed plaintiff's failure to observe
a.nd see the hole in which he claimed he stepped, constituted contributory negligence.
In the Cooper case, the court said:

nit is to be noted that although the word cobserve' as used in the interrogatory could be given a
meaning equivalent to (make observation for,' the
more usual understanding is to regard the words
(observe' and csee' as synonymous. Under such
meaning, in telling the jury that Mrs. Cooper failed
to (observe and see,' the court was only stating to
them that uncontroverted fact, for Mrs. Cooper
concedes that she did not see the obstruction. The
court was aware that under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence, the conduct of Mrs. Cooper
in failing to see the platform might, or might not,
meet the standard of care required of her, and that
the application of such standard is peculiarly within
the province of the jury.
((Plaintiff is in error in her contention that the
question of the existence of contributory negligence, under the situation which we here consider,
is one of law. Contributory negligence would only
be a question of law where the evidence showed,
with such certainty that reasonable minds could
not differ thereon, that the conduct in question
either met or failed to meet the standard of due
care. But where there is uncertainty as to whether
such standard has been met so that reasonable minds
could differ upon it, the question of whether such
negligence exists is not a matter of law, but is one
for the jury to determine."
Baker v. Decker, 212 P. 2d 679, Utah 1949, another
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case cited in the plaintiff's brief, is, we submit, excellent
authority to support defendants' contentions.
In that case plaintiff was walking along the second
story hallway of the apartment house in which she resided when she fell over equipment deposited in the hallway by the defendant, a house cleaning company. This
is a case in which the plaintiff had an election of choosing,
more or less safe places to walk. She could have taken a
route which was not usually traveled by her but which
would have been safer because it did not have equipment
over which she would have to step. The court held that
both the issues of the negligence and contributory negligence should have been submitted to the jury.
On page 682 the court said:
((Under the facts and circumstances of this
case, it was for the jury to determine whether or
not plaintiff exercised due care and caution when
she elected to continue down the hallway on the
second floor rather than to proceed by a route not
usually traveled by her."
Later in the opinion, in stating that the question of
plaintiff's contributory negligence should have been submitted to the jury, the court said:
((The last contention to be disposed of deals
with the claim that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in stepping onto the canvas and
catching her heel. We must keep in mind that
the burden is upon the defendant to establish this
claim and that unless all reasonable minds must
conclude that Mrs. Baker was negligent in the
manner in which she attempted to get over the
canvas the question of her due care must be submitted to the jury for determination. We must
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also keep in mind that this case falls within the
category of cases dealing with pedestrians who. are
subjected to unnecessary hazards by the thoughtless
conduct of others. Ordinary reasonable persons
will trip over objects, stumble over obstructions,
slip on slick surfaces and fall into holes or excavations. Even though they may see the object they
sometimes fail to comprehend and anticipate the
incident which precipitates the injury. Usually
whether a reasonable person would have properly
apprajsed the situatio-n and escaped injury is for
a jury to determine." (Emphasis supplied)
The case of Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company v. Morrill, 99 So. 297 (Alabama 1924) treats both
problems so vital to plaintiff in his brief in the case at bar.
That is, the assumption of risk and the election of a safe,
as against a dangerous, method of doing something. The
opinion could not be more in point because it specifically
declares that when such an election problem is involved it
is a matter of negligence and not a matter of assumption
of risk.
This case was brought under the Federal Employers
Liability Act as that Act existed in 1924. Plaintiff's counsel will initially contend that the case is not helpful because
it was decided before the 19 39 amendment to the FELA.
However, the facts and ruling will reveal that the decision
of the court at that time is perfectly applicable to the case
at bar. At that time assumption of risk could be a complete defense for the railroad. But contributory negligence was treated under the FELA in 1924 exactly as it is
treated now. It was not a bar to recovery but only a
source of diminution of damages. In the Louisville case,
the railroad used assumption of risk as a defense, and as
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an alternative, contributory negligence, hoping that the
court would decide that plaintiff's conduct constituted
assumption of risk. The court, however, decided that
plaintiff's conduct did not constitute assumption of risk
and might constitute contributory negligence, so the court
submitted the issue of contributory negligence to the jury.
The court, therefore, had to distinguish between assumption of risk and contributory negligence in relation to
plaintiff's conduct and decided that issue as the plaintiff
wanted it decided.
The facts were that the plaintiff alighted from a moving train, .collided with another railroad employee and was
knocked under the train and in jured.
The railroad contented that plaintiff's collision with
another employee was a part of the risk of working for a
railroad which he could anticipate and that he assumed
that risk. The court didn't go along with that theory.
The court recognized from the evidence that the plaintiff had the election of alighting from the train when he
did or waiting until it stopped, as it would have done
shortly. The court, on page 299, said:
<<The chief contention of the appellant (defendant railroad) is that the trial court confused
contributory negligence with an assumption of risk
and erroneously defined the conduct of the plaintiff,
in the adoption of the more dangerous way to
alight, as contributory negligence. We do not
think that the trial court was in error in this respect. If there are two ways in which an act can

be done-one a safe way, the other a dangerous
way-and the person who is doing the act chooses
the dangerous way with knowledge of the danger,
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he is guilty of contributory negligence, and not an
assumption of risk." (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the defendant's position is exactly
what the court's position was in the Louisville railroad
case. The defendant contends that there is evidence that
plaintiff elected to do some things the dangerous way
when he could have done them a safer way and the defendant did not, and does not, contend that assumption of
risk has anything to do with it, but that plaintiff's conduct
constituted contributory negligence. As pointed out
earlier in this brief, the jury had these facts to consider:
the plaintiff could have elected to use two hands instead
of one as he attempted to board the train; he chose to use
one. The plaintiff could have selected a safer place to
stand, that is, a place in one of those three to :five feet
areas where there was no hole; instead of on the edge
of a hole. The jury might also have concluded that the
plaintiff could have elected to walk beside the train instead
of boarding it when boarding it constituted some danger
due to the uneven footing with which he was well acquainted. Inasmuch as the jury could have decided that
he was walking or at least taking a step or two immediately prior to his attempt to board, the jury would have
been justified in concluding that he should have elected to
stand still, on solid smooth footing before he made his attempt to board.
All of these elections available to the plaintiff and
submitted to the minds of the jurors only substantiate defendant's contention that the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence was properly submitted to the jury for
determination.
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In the case of Dickson v. Virginian Railway Company, 250 F. (2) 460 (4th Circuit, 1957), the court put
the argument well in these words:

(( ::- * * As this court recently said in Atlantic
Coast Line Railroad Company v. Truett, 4th Circuit, 249 F. (2) 215, 217, (distilling the essential
truth from a raw mixture of circumstances is the
fact finder's function, and the jury is the instrument our system provides for this purpose.' Courts
are, and should be, astute not to substitute their
judgment on issues of fact for that of juries when
different inferences may be reasonably drawn from
the evidence."
In the FELA case of Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336
U. S. 53, a case arising out of Utah, Justice Douglas, reviewing all FELA cases decided by the court for the preceding ten years, said this:
((The criterion governing the exercise of our
discretion in granting or denying certiorari is not
who loses below but whether the jury function in
passing on disputed questions of fact and in drawing inferences from proven facts has been respected."
POINT II
THE JURY WAS JUSTIFIED IN ALLOTTING
THE NEGLIGENCE BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF
AND DEFENDANT AS IT DID.
There is in the record substantial evidence to justify
the jury's determination that two-thirds of the fault in
connection with this accident was attributable to the plaintiff's negligence. One view the jury may properly have
taken was that there was very little negligence on the part
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of the railroad. The jury may have reasonably concluded
from the evidence there was little, if anything, the railroad could do about keeping the Vitro Chemical Company
yard carpet smooth for its switchmen to walk on in light
of the nature of the operation that was involved. This
unloading of ore cars along the side of the track was a
continuous and necessary operation. The work had to
be done as long as Vitro continued to operate and the
railroad continued to deliver ore. The ore had to be
dumped, picked up with a clam shell bucket and stacked
in piles. There is no evidence that there was any other or
better way to do it. If the railroad had had time between
loads and had devoted an ccarmy" of men to the job of
cleaning up and grading and leveling and smoothing the
area after each cut was unloaded, the area would have been
cluttered and roughened again with each group of cars
that were brought in. It was a work area. The men knew
this. There was no_ way of avoiding it and still continuing the operation.
The plaintiff's own witness, Mr. Rask, under examination by plaintiff's own attorney clearly and honestly
described the situation:

uQ. It is necessary to keep it rough?
uA. It is impossible to keep it otherwise with a continuous operation of those cars.
uQ. You couldn't keep it up with a shovel as you do
with men in your area?
uA. If they had an army of men, but not for each
continuous operation.
uQ. What do you mean by continuous operation?
uA. Dumping one car and another one on top, that
is a continuous operation all day long." (R. 137).
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Plaintiff's counsel was trying to get his witness to
compare this work area in a private yard with non-work
areas in railroad yards where the ground adjacent to the
tracks was maintained in smooth condition with shovel
and rakes. His witness was truthful and revealed the
necessary difference that had to exist if the work was to
be done.
Perhaps defendant's counsel erred in not cross appealing and asking this court to reverse the lower court
for not granting defendant's motion for a directed verdict, for it is still defendant's belief that there was no
negligence on the part of the defendant railroad. However, believing that inasmuch as it has been so well and
thoroughly established in FELA cases that weighing and
evaluating the facts is the province of the jury, the defendant considered it futile to cross appeal in spite of the
lack of evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant.
If members of the Jury considered the conduct of
the railroad in the light of proper instructions as to negligence given it by the court, then the jury was certainly
justified in concluding the negligence of the railroad was
minimal.
Defendant's negligence is certainly doubtful under
the language of Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in the plaintiff's favorite case, Tiller v. Atlantic Coast
Line Railroad Company, supra. Justice Frankfurter said:
uBy specific provisions in the Federal Employers Liability Act, it has swept away 'assumption of
risk' as a defense once negligence is established, but
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it has left undisturbed the other meaning of (assumption of risk,' namely, that an employee injured as a consequence of being exposed to a risk
which the employer in the exercise of due care
could not avoid is not entitled to recover, since the
employer was not negligent." (Emphasis supplied)

..•.....

Later in the opinion, Justice Frankfurter said:
uThe basis of an action under the Act remains
the carrier's negligence. The carrier is not to be
relieved from the consequences of its negligence by
any claim that the employee (assumed the risk' of
its negligence. But neither is the carrier to be
charged with those injuries which result from the
rusual risks' incident to employment on railroadsrisks which cannot be eliminated through the carrier's exercise of reasonable care." (Emphasis supplied)
Defendant submits that the rough condition of the
Vitro Chemical yard was a condition which could not be
eliminated through the carrier's exercise of reasonable
care, and that therefore the defendant was not negligent
at all. However, the matter was submitted to the jury,
the jury decided there was some negligence on the part of
the railroad, and we will abide by that decision.

.::

The writer has already described in the discussion of
the previous point the negligence of the plaintiff, and
comparing that with the negligence of the railroad, it certainly appears there is substantial evidence to justify the
jury in apportioning the negligence as it did.
In the case of Williams v. Ogden Union Railway f5
Depot Company, 230 P. (2) 315, (Utah, 1951), an FELA
case involving among other issues the one of excessive
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damages, the court made a statement which is equally applicable to the issue of inadequate damages:
((The power to require remissions should not be
used as a sword to require minor variations in the
proportions of contributory negligence to negligence ~.. * * Jury verdicts need not be tailored to
exact specifications."
All of the cases cited under the discussion of Point I
with regard to viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant and with regard to honoring the
right of the jury to weigh the evidence are also applicable
in the discussion of Point II.
POINT III
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED WAS
NOT INADEQUATE.
Plaintiff contends that the verdict of $15,000.00
awarded to the plaintiff before diminution for contributory negligence was inadequate.
Plaintiff avoids facing squarely the statutory grounds
upon which a demand for a new trial for inadequate
damages is based, to-wit, Rule 59 (a) ( 5) , U tab Rules
of Civil Procedure, which reads as follows:
((Excessive or inadequate damages appearing
to have been given under the influence of passion
or prejudice."
In other words, in the rule granting of a new trial for
inadequate damages is tied to passion or prejudice.
Plaintiff in his brief makes no contention that the
jury entertained any passion or prejudice against the plain-
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tiff, and indeed there is no evidence whatsoever to indicate that they felt anything but the normal sympathy
toward an injured plaintiff.
The jury was properly and adequately instructed on
the subject of damages and plaintiff's counsel quite properly has and makes no complaint with regard to that.
In Saltas v. A/fleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P. (2) 178, a
case involving the propriety of granting a new trial for
inadequate damages, the court said:

ult is seldom that the amount of the verdict,
standing alone, is so inadequate or excessive as to
indicate passion or prejudice." (Citing Miller v.
Southern Pacific Company, 82 Utah 46, 21 P. (2)
865}.
In Hirabelli v. Daniels, 44 Utah 88, 138 P. 1172, the
court said:
((As said by some courts, juries, in cases of tort,
are more prone to over estimate than under estimate damages, and for that reason trial courts have
more often been justified in interfering with verdicts on the grounds of excessive damages than on
the grounds of inadequate damages."
It should be recalled that plaintiff's counsel moved
for a new trial on the same grounds as those set forth in
his brief, including the issue of inadequate damages; that
a hearing was held, the matter argued before the trial
court, and the trial court, who had the opportunity of
hearing the evidence and observing the witnesses and the
jury, refused to grant a new trial.
In Eleganti v. Standard Coal Co., 50 Utah 585, 168
P. 266, the court said:
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((The mere fact that the verdict of a jury may
be excessive is not alone sufficient to show that it
is the result of passion or prejudice.

rryhe criteria is the same for inadequate damages as for excessive dam,ages. (Emphasis supplied)
No distinction is made between the granting of a
new trial because of excessive damages and the
order of a new trial by reason of the fact that the
damages awarded by the verdict are inadequate. 39
Am. Jur., New Trial, Sec. 145, p. 151."
In Duffy v. Union Pac. R. Co., 118 TJtah 82, 218 P.
(2) 1080, (1950) the court said:
((Previously decided cases are of little value in
fixing present day standards or in assisting courts
in determining excessive awards. Both the court
and jury are required to deal with many unknown
factors and a good guess is about the best that
can be hoped for. The permissible minimum and
maximum limits within which a jury may operate
for a given injury are presently far apart and must
continue to be widespread so long as pain and suffering must be measured by money standards. If
the jurors award damages which all reasonable persons would conclude were not outside permissible
limits, we cannot invade their province by substituting our judgment for theirs, but when we
believe that all reasonable minds would conclude
the limits have been exceeded we are permitted to
correct the error." (Emphasis added.)
There is also another factor which the jury and this
court may properly take into consideration in determining whether or not damages are adequate. In cases of
doubtful liability, a court should not upset a verdict on
the grounds of inadequate damages.
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This is not a new or novel principle. It has been
recognized in many cases. In McDowell v. City of Portsmouth, 3 5 S. E. 821 (Va.), it was held that if the evidence
preponderates in the defendant's favor on the question of
liability a new trial is not to be granted for inadequate
damages, even though it is sufficient to support a verdict
that defendant is liable. The court quoted with approval
the language used in Rawle v. Mclllhenny, 177 S. E. 214,
98 A.L.R. 930, where it was said:
uThe right of a plaintiff to have a verdict in
his favor set aside, over the objection of the defendant, on the ground of inadequacy, does not
depend solely upon the evidence bearing upon the
damage he has suffered. Both the apparent cause
for the return of an inadequate verdict and the
state of the evidence relative to the liability of the
defendant have an important, and to a considerable
extent interacting bearing upon the plaintiff's right
to have the verdict set aside."
In Olek v. Fern Rock Woolen Mills, 180 F. 117, an
employee brought suit against his employer on the grounds
that the defendant had negligently furnished the plaintiff
an unsafe place to work. The plaintiff recovered a verdict
for $250.00. Motion for a new trial on the grounds of
inadequate damages was denied. The court said:
((There was sufficient evidence of defendant's
negligence to carry the case to the jury, but in the
judgment of the court the great weight of the evidence was against the plaintiff's right to recover
anything."
In Burkitt v. Vail, 215 P. 887 (Ore.), plaintiff recovered damages of $1.00 on account of negligent damage
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to a truck. A motion for a new trial on grounds of inadequate damages was denied. On appeal the supreme court
held that a new trial was properly denied and said:
ccThe evidence in the instant case was such
that the jury could reasonably and properly have
returned a verdict for the defendant."
In Cochran v. Wilson, 229 S. W. 1050 (Mo.), the
plaintiff sought a new trial on the grounds that the damages awarded her were inadequate. It was a suit for personal injuries in which she had recovered a verdict in the
sum of $250.00. In affirming the lower court, the Supreme Court of Missouri recognized appellant's right to
have a verdict set aside for either an excessively large or
ridiculously small amount where the result indicated passion and prejudice on the part of the jury. The court
said that in passing upon such questions the presumption
is in favor of the good conduct of the jury and ccif upon
the whole record the case preponderates in favor of the
defendant, or the testimony is evenly balanced, the courts
will refuse to interfere with nominal verdicts, although
at first view they may appear illogical." The court approved the idea, that the reason for holding tenaciously to
damages found by a jury in personal injury cases is that in
this class of cases there is no scale by which the damages
may be graduated with certainty. ccThe damages admit of
no other test than intelligence of the jury, governed by a
sense of justice."

A review of our discussion under Point II may indicate to the court that the members of the jury might properly have been influenced to some extent in their award of
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damages on the realization that there was little, if any,
negligence on the part of the railroad.
However, whether that was in their minds or not,
defendant, submits that the $15,000.00 verdict was substantial and thoroughly adequate in light of the fact that
plaintiff is in good health other than the trouble he is having with his shoulder, and that it was obvious to the jury
that there are many types of work that he could do, and
that he would not be confined to the job of driving a cab
or limited to an income of $90'.00 a month.
CONCLUSION
Bearing on all three points discussed in this brief,
are a recent decision of the Utah Supreme Court and a
much quoted decision of the United States Supreme Court.
In Horsley v. Robinson, 186 P. (2) 592 {Utah 1947),
Justice Wade's language, we submit, wraps up the argument covering all issues raised in the plaintiff's brief:
uSince the trial court is not required to submit
special interrogatories and therefore we do not
know how the jury in fact did determine the controlling issues we must presume that they found the
facts necessary to support their verdict if the evidence was sufficient to sustain such a finding. Thus
we must view the evidence in its most favorable
aspect to suppot:_t the verdict which the jury has
rendered and if from the evidence the jury could
reasonably find facts necessary to sustain their verdict it must be sustained. This is true, even though
had we been the triers of the facts we would have
found them differently, or even though we may
not believe that the jury did in fact so find or,
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even though we.believe that such a finding would be
against the great preponderance of the evidence.
u ( 1)
Under a general verdict we cannot be
assured what facts the jury found or that they
found the facts necessary to sustain their verdict.
So it is universally held under the common law
system, as it must be in order to give stability to
jury verdicts, that the appellate court must sustain the verdict where the evidence is sufficient to
support a finding of the necessary facts to do so.
Otherwise, the appellate court would be required
to reverse every verdict where in its opinion the
great preponderance of the evidence is against a
finding of the necessary facts to support it, even
though the evidence is such that reasonable minds
might conclude from the evidence that such necessary facts happened. To do so would be to review
the evidence no matter what we call it. The question of what were the facts and where is the preponderance of the evidence is for the jury and not
for the court to determine. Our problem is only to
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to
sustain the verdict. In doing so our standard is:
Could a reasonable. mind be convinced by the evidence of the necessary facts to support the verdict?
If so, it must be sustained.

((That this court is not authorized to review
the facts found by the jury is expressly provided
by our Constitution, Article 8, Section 9, where it
is provided (In cases at law the appeal shall be on
questions of law alone.' Since we cannot review
thefacts, whatever we think of where the preponderance of the evidence is, is immaterial. If we
were to review the evidence and reverse this case
because we think the preponderance of the evi-
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dence on a material issue is against the plaintiff, we
do so in violation of that constitutional provision."
In the FELA case of Tennant v. Peoria f5 P. U. Ry.

Co., 321 U. S. 29, one of the leading and frequently cited
cases on this question, wherein the lower court had set
aside a jury verdict, the Supreme ~court of the United
States said:
uNo court is then justified in substituting its
conclusions for those of the twelve jurors.

* *

*

uit is not the function of a court to search the
record for conflicting circumstantial evidence nor
to take the case away from the jury on the theory
that the proof gives equal support to inconsistent
and uncertain inferences.

*

* *

uCourts are not free to re-weigh the evidence
and set aside the jury verdict merely because the
jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that other results are
more reasonable." (Emphasis supplied)
Defendant submits that the jury's verdict in the case
at bar should not be disturbed.
Respectfully submitted
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
By MARVIN J. BERTOCH

Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent
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